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indigenous, vibrant civil society, an economic crisis had put politicians on the defensive, and 
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World War II, only communism could hold the federation together. Once that (discredited) 
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The level of parallel mobilization of ordinary people in Yugoslavia, namely of 
industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs, various groups during the antibureaucratic 
revolution and Kosovo Albanians, surpassed those in most other East European 
states, if judged by the numbers of participants, the variety of groups involved 
and the temporal and geographical extension of mobilization. Popular protests 
ranged from small  and orderly events  to  large  and highly disruptive  protest 
marches and demonstrations, which led to considerable changes in the personal 
composition  and  policies  of  Yugoslavia’s  political  elites,  as  well  as  in  the 
structure and operation of the authoritarian regime. However, the images of this 
wave of mobilization that dominate published accounts sharply contrast  with 
those  of  the  people  power  associated  with  political  struggles  in  other  East 
European states, and sketch authoritarian, even totalitarian mobilization, and the 
dark forces of nationalism. (Vladisavljević 2008: 2)
The Yugoslav transition to democracy is perhaps the most complex of all the 
Eastern  European  cases.  As  the  opening  quote  suggests,  the  country’s 
democratization process is puzzling for several reasons. First, it can be argued 
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that Yugoslavia enjoyed the most favorable initial conditions of any country in 
the region: the regime was relatively liberal, there was an indigenous, vibrant 
civil society in place, an economic crisis had put politicians on the defensive, 
and the country was not overly tied to either Western or Eastern influence. Had 
these structural conditions told the full story, Yugoslavia might have been able to 
dissolve without the most violent and heinous conflict Europe had experienced 
since   World  War  II.  However,  one  major  factor  came  to  trump  all  others: 
nationalism. The history of Yugoslavia cannot be told without attention to ethnic 
rivalries. Since the country was a federation consisting of six republics and two 
autonomous provinces, imposed on its citizens by the communists that came to 
power after World War II, only communism could hold the federation together.1 
As  we  will  see,  once  that  (discredited)  ideological  glue  was  removed, 
Yugoslavia collapsed on itself. 
In  Yugoslavia,  nationalism,  which  did  not  correspond  perfectly  to  the 
various republics, trumped all other issues, including democratization. Unlike 
some of the other federal states in Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union, Valerie Bunce (1999) has pointed out that the federal center of 
Yugoslavia was inherently weak, consisting in the final diagnosis of little more 
than the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). While officially a federation, Bunce 
goes  as  far  as  to  call  Yugoslavia  a  “confederation”  because  unlike  the 
Czechoslovak and Soviet “actual” federations, which were “characterized by the 
existence  of  shared  power  based  on  territorial-administrative  divisions”, 
Yugoslavia  was  characterized  by  “the  domination  of  the  republics  over  the 
center” (1999: 111). Despite his best efforts, Tito had only managed to bring the 
six republics together by allowing each state significant autonomy in a highly 
decentralized federal structure. For example, each republic was, following the 
USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, allowed its own territorial defense 
force, and the Yugoslav market, including its banking system, was segmented 
along republican lines (Bunce 1999: 111). Furthermore, it  can be argued that 
Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948 absolved republican leaders of the overpowering 
presence of Moscow, and that regional politicians therefore felt less bound to the 
policies of the federal center, especially after the death of Tito in 1980. 
A final  important  point  is  that  some of  the  constituent  republics  were 
historical enemies. In particular, there was little love lost between the Catholic 
Croats  and the  Orthodox Serbs.  For  example,  during World War II  Croatian 
fascists, the Utasha, fought with the Axis powers, and, importantly, against the 
1 Yugoslavia as a concept existed before World War II as a monarchy known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
(previously the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was established in 1918 following the fall of the  
Austro-Hungarian Empire in a moment of intense nationalism.
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Serbian Chetniks. After the war, Tito’s solution to the lasting animosities and 
horrendous collective memories was to forbid any discussion on the topic. While 
in the short run this allowed Yugoslavia to unite under a socialist banner, when 
the  communist  glue  began  to  lose  its  adhesive  qualities  little  could  prevent 
ingrained  nationalist  grievances  from rising  to  the  surface.  In  this  explosive 
context,  it  is  perhaps  little  wonder  that  democratization  and  other  political 
concerns  took  a  backseat  to  more  primordial  preoccupations,  such  as  ethnic 
survival and revenge. After all, who cares about whether or not one’s leader is a 
tyrant if one’s neighbors are the “real” enemy. In short, Yugoslavia’s historical 
record had to be resolved before democratization could commence. As we will 
see, different republics found different ways of settling that record.
Periodization
The periodization of the Yugoslav democratization process is a complex matter 
for  several  reasons.  First,  and  most  obviously,  the  Yugoslavia  that  began  to 
liberalize during the 1980s no longer existed by the time its successor states 
became democracies, which means that the democratization process has to be 
considered  across  a  number  of  national  contexts.  In  Slovenia,  the  situation 
resembled that of Hungary and resulted in a quick transition to democracy. In 
Croatia and Serbia, the transitions took longer and involved Western support for 
opposition  groups.  Croatia  left  authoritarianism  behind  through  an  orderly 
election in 2000 while Serbia (at the time still called Yugoslavia and united with 
Montenegro)  experienced  the  first  “color  revolution”  of  the  2000s  when 
hundreds  of  thousands  protested  Slobodan  Milošević’s  attempt  to  steal  the 
presidential election. In the remaining former republics, (The Former Yugoslav 
Republic  of)  Macedonia  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  ethnic  divisions  and 
lagging  economic  development  have  resulted  in  a  much  slower  path  to 
democracy. Although scholars considered Macedonia democratized by the end 
of the century’s first  decade, Bosnia and Herzegovina is stuck in a transition 
limbo due to a highly complex compromise that was struck in order to end the 
war in that country. Scholars have suggested that Slovenia democratized within 
two years of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and held its first multi-party elections 
in 1990 (Boduszyński 2010: 119), whereas Croatia completed its transition in 
2000  (Levitsky  and  Way  2010:  117),  Serbia  (and  Montenegro)  by  late 
2003/early 2004 (Levitsky and Way 2010: 109-13), and Macedonia in the late 
2000s (Levitsky and Way 2010: 124). Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had to go 
through a “painstakingly sluggish” process, had still not democratized by 2007 
(Vasilevski 2007: 10). 
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Second, as I will show in this report, Yugoslavia is a very different beast 
compared to its Eastern European neighbors. In contrast to the Soviet satellite 
states, Yugoslavia was a relatively liberal country with good relations with the 
West. By the mid-1980s, the country resembled Hungary in the sense that the 
communist  elites  in  the  various  republics  had  begun  to  lose  faith  in  the 
communist ideology that constituted the only glue holding the fragile federation 
together.  Consequently,  its  citizens  could for  the  most  part  travel  freely  and 
opposition groups enjoyed considerable freedom to voice their opinions, so long 
as they stayed away from overtly political issues. 
The political context makes it difficult to establish when democratization 
began, simply because Yugoslavia was less autocratic to begin with. The various 
republics  enjoyed  substantial  autonomy from the  federal  government,  which 
under Josip Broz Tito only retained tight control over economic and military 
issues.  Nonetheless,  one  could  use  either  the  establishment  of  the  1974 
Constitution (which further decentralized Yugoslavia and thus began the process 
of  fragmentation)  or  Tito’s  death  in  1980  as  the  starting  point  of  the 
democratization process. As noted above, there is no single Yugoslav point of 
consolidation,  but  rather  five  different  ones.  At  least  one  state,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, is not considered to have completed the transition to democracy. 
To further emphasize the complex nature of the Yugoslav transition, one 
scholar points out that on “the eve of the 1989 revolutions in eastern and central 
Europe, Yugoslavia was better poised than any other socialist country to make a 
successful transition to a market economy and the west” (Woodward 1995: 1). 
Still, Yugoslavia took longer to complete the process and was the only country 
in the region to go through a civil war. As Stokes (1993) points out, 
Yugoslavia had neither a velvet revolution nor a velvet divorce. Midway through 
1991 two of its six constituent republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their 
independence, provoking a vicious civil war that spread in 1992 to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Ethnic emotions run deep throughout Eastern Europe, but nowhere 
did  they  reach  the  level  of  bestiality  as  they  did  in  Yugoslavia.  …  What 
happened? How did Yugoslavia,  the first  Communist  state  to  break with the 
Soviet Union and the most open Communist state in the world in the 1960s, 
come to this depressing impasse? (218)
The  answer,  I  suggest,  is  that  unlike  other  Eastern  European  states, 
democratization became secondary to other concerns, such as nationalism, partly 
because  the  lack  of  democracy  was  considered  less  of  a  problem here  then 
elsewhere.  Nationalism  was  indeed  a  factor  in  some  of  the  other  Eastern 
European  transitions,  such  as  those  of  Czechoslovakia  and  the  GDR,  but 
8
nowhere else did it have such devastating consequences as it did in Yugoslavia, 
nor did it derail those countries’ democratization efforts (see above). Ironically 
then,  Yugoslavia’s  advantageous  starting  point,  seen  from a  democratization 
perspective,  turned  out  to  be  a  great  disadvantage  when  republican  political 
leaders sought to save their positions of power by exploiting nationalist concerns 
and rhetoric.
Structural Conditions
The structural conditions surrounding Yugoslavia’s transition are, like the issue 
of  periodization,  complex.  In  order  to  understand  the  context  in  which  the 
country  dissolved  in  the  early  1990s  and  was  overtaken  by  severe  ethnic 
conflicts, it is necessary to have some grounding in the history of Yugoslavia. 
Unlike most of the Eastern European countries that emerged after World War II, 
the creation of Yugoslavia as a communist  state was not the result  of Soviet 
intervention.  Rather,  it  was  the  logical  outcome of  the  mass  armed  struggle 
waged by the Communist  Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) during the war against 
regional  fascist  forces that supported the Axis. The communists,  led by Tito, 
were able to assert control over what was known at the time as the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, and by 1945 they had succeeded in eliminating the existing multi-
party system. In January of 1946 King Peter II was removed from power while 
in exile and the country introduced a new constitution under its new name — the 
Socialist  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Composed of six republics 
(Croatia,  Slovenia,  Serbia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Macedonia,  and 
Montenegro)  and  two  autonomous  provinces  (Vojvodina  and  Kosova,  both 
belonging to Serbia), the new territorial entity gave significant freedoms to the 
various  republics  in  a  decentralized  system  that  would  become  even  more 
decentralized following the adoption of the 1974 Constitution (Bunce 1999: 111; 
Gibianiski 2006: 18).
While  initially  aligned  with  Stalin’s  Soviet  Union,  the  relationship 
between the two Communist states collapsed as early as 1948 after  Moscow 
repeatedly accused Tito of not being strong enough in his support of the Soviet 
Union.  The  conflict  revolved  around  Stalin’s  fear  that  Tito  was  trying  to 
establish a Balkan version of the USSR that would constitute a rival communist 
center  in  Europe.  However,  the  Soviet  leader  never  punished  Yugoslavia 
militarily  as  he  dealt  with  East  German,  Hungarian,  and  Czechoslovakian 
dissent.  Instead,  Yugoslavia  was  allowed  to  simply  sever  relations  with  the 
USSR,  relations  that  were  later  repaired  and  restored  to  normality  when 
Yugoslavia joined the group of non-aligned states. Why did Stalin not try to 
bring the fellow communist state into the Soviet sphere? Following World War 
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II,  Churchill  and Stalin  had agreed at  Yalta  that  “Yugoslavia  should  be  half 
within  the  Western  sphere  of  influence  and  half  within  the  Eastern  sphere” 
(Licht 2000: 118). Invading obstinate Yugoslavia and bringing it within Soviet 
control would therefore come at a much higher price than the invasions carried 
out in other Eastern European states.
Yugoslavia’s  strained  relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union  did  however 
result  in  Western  compensation  as  US  and  European  governments  began  to 
provide Yugoslavia with economic aid in the late 1940s. As one commentator 
explains,
U.S. officials had been unwilling or reluctant to provide aid either to fascist or to 
communist  dictatorships after the war,  but  as U.S.-Soviet  conflict  sharpened, 
U.S. officials reconsidered, and began providing aid to dictatorships on its side 
of the Cold War divide. After Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union in 1948, 
the U.S. government released frozen Yugoslav assets, including $47 million in 
gold,  and later provided Tito’s regime with loans,  grants, and military aid in 
concert  with  aid  from  the  World  Bank  and  U.S.  allies  in  Western  Europe. 
Between 1951 and 1960, “the United States extended to Yugoslavia $2.7 billion 
worth of military and economic assistance on a non-repayable basis,” somewhat 
more than it  provided to regimes in Spain,  Portugal and Greece in the same 
period.  This influx of foreign aid promoted double-digit  economic growth in 
Yugoslavia, as it did in Iberia and Greece, during the 1950s. Economic recovery 
and  growth  was  also  assisted  by  the  normalization  of  Yugoslavia’s  trade 
relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after Khrushchev repaired 
Soviet relations with Tito in 1955. (Schaeffer 2000: 49)
Thanks to American aid, the Yugoslav economy grew rapidly in the 1950s and 
1960s.  The Yugoslav  government  had sought  to  develop its  own brand of  a 
socialist  economic  system  that  incorporated  some  aspects  of  the  capitalist 
market system. For example, private businesses were allowed as long as they 
employed  no  more  than  four  people.  Still,  the  state  ran  all  of  the  major 
businesses, albeit in a less centralized manner than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
The  “self  management”  system meant  that  workers  were  in  control  of  their 
factories and workplaces. In each factory, the workers elected their management 
through  a  “one  worker,  one  vote”  arrangement.  For  a  while,  this  system 
benefited the country greatly, with the Yugoslav economy growing at a high rate 
and with low levels of unemployment. However, inefficient use of foreign aid 
meant that although workers received relatively high salaries in comparison to 
their Eastern European colleagues, the rate of economic growth slowed in the 
1970s.  The  subsequent  economic  downturn  was  exacerbated  by  the  global 
economic crisis that occurred at the same time, and when the second oil crisis hit 
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the world in 1979, just a year before Tito’s death, “the Yugoslav miracle” was 
officially  over  (Stokes:  1993:  229).  The  reason  the  economic  crisis  hit  the 
country only in the late 1970s was that, like other nations in the region and in 
Latin America, Yugoslavia had increased its borrowing from the West in order to 
compensate for lost revenues. As a result, between 1971 and 1975 the country’s 
debt doubled from $2.7 billion to $5.8 billion, climbing to $20.5 billion in 1981. 
Lenders now demanded that Yugoslav leaders make tough decisions, including 
the imposition of structural adjustment policies and various austerity programs 
(Schaeffer  2000:  51;  Stokes  1993:  229-30).  While  this  eventually  helped 
Yugoslavia stabilize its economy, it came at a terrible political price as workers 
lost their jobs and prices rose. Before Ante Marković’s (the country’s last prime 
minister) unpopular policies began to pay off in 1990, the declining economic 
situation had already led to widespread discontent and workers’ movements that 
demanded change (Stokes 1993: 238-41).
Yugoslavia’s economic problems were not limited to its foreign debt. As a 
federation, the country consisted of economically diverse republics. The richest 
republics,  Slovenia  and  Croatia,  enjoyed  relatively  large  influxes  of  foreign 
capital, thanks mainly to Western and Eastern tourism. While the republics had 
some  autonomy  in  how  to  spend  their  own  money,  much  of  it  was  still 
redistributed across the federation. This meant that the richer states contributed 
disproportionally to the development of the less wealthy parts of Yugoslavia, 
such as Kosova and Macedonia. It was this issue that forced the introduction of 
a new constitution in 1974 and in some ways made way for the dissolution of 
the  country.  The  new  constitution  further  decentralized  Yugoslavia  in  a 
somewhat desperate attempt by the federal elites to keep the federation intact. 
Unfortunately, none of the most important republics were content with the new 
constitution. Croatia and Slovenia felt that the decentralization efforts did not go 
far enough, while Serbia had hoped to prevent the fragmentation of the federal 
system in which they were the central power (Stokes 1993:228). However, in the 
end, all national elites were to benefit from the federal Yugoslav arrangements in 
the late 1980s. 
“By  the  mid-1980s,  the  political  and  economic  foundations  of  the 
Yugoslav system—a system commonly called “Titoism” – began to crumble. 
Nationalism festered in all the constituent republics” (Vasilevski 2007: 5). As 
mentioned above, all republics suffered economically, but thanks to the federal 
composition of the country no republican leader had to assume responsibility for 
the crisis. This was decidedly different from the rest of Eastern Europe where 
the  state  and  the  party  were  indivisible.  Yugoslavia’s  complex  arrangement 
included a federal communist league, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(LCY), and autonomous communist leagues in each of the republics. This meant 
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two things: first, the LCY had no meaningful constituency other than its army 
(JNA), and second, each republic’s communist leaders could blame the federal 
center for the country’s economic problems. Hence, when the economic crisis 
began to affect politics in the republics in a very real way in the mid-1980s, each 
republic’s  leadership  blamed  the  other  republics  for  their  nation’s  economic 
misfortunes in an attempt to maintain power and legitimacy. Not only was this 
convenient for warding off economic criticism, it also resonated well with the 
burgeoning nationalist movements that were emerging throughout Yugoslavia, 
especially  among  Kosovo  Serbs  and  Slovenes.  Consequently,  the  economic 
crisis forced communist politicians to become nationalists, a move which could 
potentially save their positions of power but spelled disaster for the country at 
large. Evidence of how detrimental this turn of events was for the country is 
represented  by  the  fact  that  although  Marković’s  austerity  policies  largely 
repaired the Yugoslav economy and managed to persuade foreign investors to 
return  to  the  country  in  1990  and  1991,  the  republican  leaderships  largely 
refused to execute his economic policies. Rather than saving the economy by 
introducing unpopular  reforms,  communist  leaders  jumped on the nationalist 
bandwagon  and  condemned  both  the  federal  leadership  and  their  greedy 
neighbors (Stokes 1993: 238-41). Furthermore, most communist leaders became 
socialists  overnight  and distanced themselves both from communist  ideology 
and the single-party system.
A final  structural  condition  should  be mentioned,  namely  Yugoslavia’s 
international context. Unlike most Eastern European socialist states, Yugoslavia 
enjoyed  good  relations  with  the  West.  In  addition  to  relative  economic 
prosperity,  Western relations also seem to have had a  liberalizing impact  on 
Yugoslavia  as  a  whole,  especially  in  Slovenia  and  Serbia.  In  particular, 
“Slovenes,  as  close  neighbors  of  Italy  and  Austria,  had  long  considered 
themselves somewhat removed from the passions of Balkan politics” (Stokes 
1993: 236). As we shall see later, one consequence of this proximity to Western 
Europe was that Slovenian dissidents enjoyed significant freedoms as early as 
the 1970s, and 
when  Tito  died  Slovenia  boasted  perhaps  the  most  independently  minded 
intelligentsia in Yugoslavia. By the mid-1980s its capital city Ljubljana could 
boast of an influential student press, a strong group of intellectuals surrounding 
the avant-garde  journal  Nova revija (New Review),  and the first  stirrings  of 
alternative movements of feminists, gays, peace activists, and environmentalists. 
(Stokes 1993: 236)
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In  short,  by  the  end  of  the  1980s  Yugoslavia  harbored  two  important 
preconditions  for  mass  mobilization:  a  faltering  economy  and  a  relatively 
vibrant civil society.
Political Opportunities
Because of the faltering economy and the fact that a burgeoning civil society 
already existed in both Slovenia and Serbia in the early 1980s, Yugoslavia as a 
whole must be described as a state vulnerable to pressures from below. As such, 
it  took  little  to  further  destabilize  the  federal  structure  of  the  country. 
Nonetheless, in 1980 the country experienced a destabilizing incident that would 
spell the end of the federation within just over a decade. The death of Tito on 
May 4th shocked a country that  had grown accustomed to Tito’s 35 years of 
leadership. As the population mourned, Tito’s political heirs struggled to keep 
their leader’s project viable. However, that was destined to be a difficult task 
because  of  the  particularities  of  Yugoslav  socialism.  Whereas  other  Eastern 
European countries had accepted socialism as a political ideology, in Yugoslavia 
that  acceptance  was  coupled  with  a  nationalist  ideology,  namely  that  of  the 
Yugoslav people. Historically, the different nations that made up the federation 
had considered themselves distinct from one another, and had often fought wars 
against each other. After World War II, Tito managed to put old grudges to rest 
by authoritatively imposing Yugoslav nationalism upon the country through the 
proxy of socialism and by forbidding debates about past crimes conducted in the 
names of nations. This meant that the two ideologies were intimately linked and 
maintained  in  large  part  by  Tito  himself  (Stokes  1993).  As  Stokes  (1993) 
explains,       
the linkage of “Yugoslav” and “socialist” contained a critical weakness that Tito 
and  his  colleagues  could  never  have  imagined.  As  long  as  the  Communist 
movement  remained  strong,  Yugoslavism  was  not  in  danger.  If  nationalism 
reared its head the party could and did push it back under the surface. If the 
League of  Communists  of  Yugoslavia  should  disintegrate,  however,  then  the 
Yugoslavism it championed would disintegrate too. (223)
Unfortunately  for  the  federal  government,  the  death  of  Tito  represented  the 
beginning of the disintegration of the LCY, as the leader’s death coincided with 
the emergence of a new generation of party leaders in the various republics. The 
generational shift resulted in the “pragmatic relaxation of repressive practices” 
(Vladisavljević 2008: 47) since the younger politicians were much less ready 
than their predecessors to clamp down on dissidents. Although the entire country 
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experienced  an  easing  of  government  control,  it  was  particularly  salient  in 
Serbia and Slovenia. In these two republics, the new generation of politicians 
“tolerated both cultural and political dissent and engaged in informal alliances 
with protest groups and dissident intellectuals in the second half of the 1980s” 
(Vladisavljević 2008: 48), which naturally emboldened activists and resulted in 
an invigorated civil society. 
The main problem for the Yugoslav government was that political power 
had come to reside in Tito personally. Consequently, after his death no politician 
emerged  who  could  fill  his  shoes.  In  office  Tito  had  been  able  to  manage 
republican divisions by decentralizing the federation and providing citizens with 
Western-style freedoms, knowing that his personal control over the army and his 
status  as  national  hero  would  prevent  republican  leaders  from opposing  the 
system  he  had  built.  However,  this  “solution”  experienced  major  systemic 
problems once Tito was gone. After his passing, Yugoslavia came to lack the 
stuff that had held the federation together for 35 years. 
Due  to  the  highly  particular  arrangement  of  Yugoslavia  into  a 
decentralized federation composed of former enemy nations, one might argue 
that the country’s succession crisis was the only political opportunity activists 
needed in order to act. It was not the fact that a dictator (albeit a popular and 
rather  successful  one)  had  died  that  mattered  most,  but  rather  that  the  only 
failsafe that prevented the federated nations from entering into conflict with one 
another  had  disappeared.  From my  readings  the  impression  I  gather  is  that 
Yugoslavia  was  always  ready  to  explode  and that  only  the  presence  of  Tito 
prevented that from happening sooner. But even for Tito managing competing 
national interests was a difficult task, a task he solved by giving the republics 
considerable autonomy. In this manner he was able to maintain the bonds that 
held  the  country  together,  yet  every  time  he  strengthened  the  republics  he 
weakened  those  bonds.  As  we  shall  see,  post-Tito  Yugoslavia  was  ripe  for 
destruction  as  the  economic  crisis  that  coincided  with  the  leader’s  death 
exacerbated nationalist hostilities. Add to this the fact that Tito’s policies had 
already  created  the  most  open  political  environment  for  civil  society 
mobilization  in  Eastern  Europe  and  what  we  are  left  with  is  a  context 
characterized by a weak state, a disastrous economy, a vibrant civil society, and 
long-standing  ethnic  hostilities.  In  short,  there  was  no  shortage  of  political 
opportunities  in  Yugoslavia.  The  only  question  became  which  group  would 
exploit them. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the republics’ political elites were among 
those that tried to maximize their own standing in this context, and it is to them 
we now turn our attention.  
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Elites
Tito’s  death  had  a  tremendous  impact  on  all  societal  groups,  including  the 
federal and republican elites. However, the leader’s passing affected these two 
groups in drastically different ways. While the federal leaders struggled against 
pent-up  popular  frustration  with  the  economic  performance  of  the  country, 
republican  elites  enjoyed  real  independence  for  the  first  time  in  decades. 
Beginning  in  the  1980s,  republican  leaders  exploited  Yugoslavia’s  federal 
arrangement and sought to limit the power of the central leadership. One way 
this  was  done  was  via  their  unprecedented  efforts  to  block  economic  and 
political reforms, and in December of 1987 the Federal Assembly failed to pass 
the budget for the following year for the first time in the country’s history. In 
Tito’s  lifetime such heresy  would  have been inconceivable,  but  by  the  mid-
1980s  the  old  guard  of  Tito  supporters  was  rapidly  aging  and  replaced  by 
younger career politicians unwedded to the ideological values and the historical 
legacy of the party, not personally linked to Tito, and who had no intention of 
relinquishing  power  because  of  economic  mistakes  made  in  the  name  of 
socialism (Vladisavljević 2008: 126).   “By 1988 the great  majority  of Tito’s 
chosen coterie of republics’ leaders had been replaced with leaders who had no 
common  loyalties”  and  “both  the  Yugoslav  federation  and  the  Yugoslav 
Communist  party – the League of Communists  – which nominally ruled the 
country had lost much of their legitimacy” (Pavković 2010: 76). In short, unlike 
their  predecessors  the  new  elites  had  little  incentive  to  cooperate  with  one 
another. As a consequence,
Old and new divisions in the political class came to the fore, such as between 
promoters of greater control of Serbia’s central government over its autonomous 
provinces and their  foes;  between advocates of a stronger federal  centre and 
protectors of the status quo; between proponents of change in the party’s Kosovo 
policy  and  their  opponents;  between  conservative  and  liberally  minded 
politicians;  between  members  of  various  political  generations;  and  between 
high- and low-ranking officials. Since the divisions often cut across one another 
and high officials engaged in complex political manoeuvring, relations within 
the political class became rather complicated. (Vladisavljević 2008: 126)  
By the 1990s it became clear that political elites throughout the federation had 
abandoned Tito’ s approach and had started playing on nationalism as a way of 
saving their own power (Licht 2000: 113). Abandoning the old ideology was not 
a sufficient measure if one wanted to hold on to power. Strong currents were 
brewing throughout Yugoslavia, the strongest of which was nationalism. Shrewd 
(or desperate?) politicians in virtually all of the republics capitalized on what 
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was  probably  their  last  chance  to  cling  to  power  and  embraced  populist 
nationalism. As we shall see in the following sections, the nationalist movement 
had been brewing since at least 1981, but it was the Kosovo Serb mobilization in 
the mid-1980s that was to play the most  important role in the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. 
As mentioned previously, nationalism was in all the republican leaders’ 
interests  since  it  was  the  only  way  for  them  to  avoid  responsibility  for 
Yugoslavia’s  economic  demise.  By  blaming  the  federal  government  and  the 
other republics, republican leaders hoped to save themselves (Licht 2000: 116-
7). The most talented politician in this blame game was Serbian leader Slobodan 
Milošević. Milošević rose to power in Serbia precisely because of his support 
for the Serb minority in Kosova.  Since 1985 (see below), Kosova Serbs had 
protested  against  what  they  perceived  to  be  discrimination  at  the  hands  of 
Kosova’s  Albanian  majority.  Discontented  with  the  Albanian  leadership  of 
Serbia’s  autonomous province,  the Kosovo Serbs sought  protection from the 
federal  government  and  from  Serbia  itself.  In  what  has  been  depicted  as 
Milošević’s crowning moment, the future dictator addressed a crowd of 15,000 
Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins in the night and early morning of April 24 and 
25, 1987. While different accounts of the speech exist, Milošević is supposed to 
have told the crowd something along the following lines:    
The first thing that I wish to tell you, comrades, is that you must remain here. 
This is your land, your houses are here, your fields and gardens, your memories. 
… It was never characteristic of the spirit of the Serb and Montenegrin people to 
knuckle under to difficulties, to demobilize itself when it must fight, to become 
demoralized when the going is tough. You must remain here on account of your 
ancestors and descendants. Otherwise, we would be shaming the ancestors and 
disillusioning the descendants. (cit. in Banac 1992: 176-7)
In what can only be described as shrewd opportunism, Milošević was thus able 
to turn nationalist complaints against Serbia into political gain. From that point 
on he became the protector of all Serbs, and the most powerful politician in all 
of Yugoslavia. Once he had consolidated Serbian power, Milošević completed 
his renunciation of Tito’s rule by permitting hitherto forbidden public criticism 
of the father  of  the nation.  But contrary to  what  might  have been expected, 
Milošević “permitted the denigration of Tito not because of Tito’s dictatorial 
record but because Tito was a Croat and a federalist,” and “put the party-state of 
Serbia, with its media, cultural and educational institutions, armed power and 
federal influence, and even the usually disloyal intelligentsia, in the service of 
Serbian national homogenization and supremacy” (Banac 1992: 178). In short, 
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Milošević unleashed the one social force he felt he could control, nationalism. 
Meanwhile,  other  more  benign  currents  within  civil  society  were  quickly 
marginalized to make a way for the protection of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.
Although Milošević was certainly the most radical nationalist  leader to 
emerge  in  Yugoslavia  in  the  1980s  he  was  far  from being  the  only  one.  In 
Slovenia, the most liberal republic and where civil society had made the biggest 
inroads, socialist leaders abandoned socialism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
As fear of Milošević grew throughout Yugoslavia, and in Slovenia in particular, 
the  Slovenian  socialists  exploited  the  situation  by  hijacking  the  nationalist 
agenda of the opposition and transforming itself into the Party of Democratic 
Renewal. “Under its new slogan ‘Europe now’ it presented itself as a national 
party of all Slovenes which was ready to find a place for Slovenia, as a fully 
sovereign state, within a new confederal Yugoslavia” (Pavković 2010: 110-11). 
While  Slovenian  opposition  politicians  complained  (political  plurality  had 
already been approved in Slovenia) that the socialists were trespassing on their 
political  ground,  this  development  shows  how  nationalist  concerns  assumed 
vastly different shapes in the two republics. In the last section of this report I 
will discuss this discrepancy further. 
Finally,  in  Croatia  counter-elites,  and  in  particular  discredited  former 
party members, came to dominate the nationalist movement. The reason for this 
was simple: the Croatian communists belonged to the anti-nationalist wing of 
the  party  that  had  been  handed  control  of  Croatia  after  Tito  purged  the 
nationalist  communists  who  had  pressed  for  increased  autonomy  and  even 
threatened secession in 1971. This ordeal experienced in the 1970s meant that 
Croatia was a more repressive context for dissidents than Serbia and Slovenia, 
and the Party therefore tried its best to contain the Nationalists, headed by a 
former communist named Franjo Tuđman. However, threatened by Milošević’s 
nationalist rhetoric, the socialists, “in an attempt to widen their popular support 
… found in late 1988 new tolerance for nationalist dissidents” (Pavković 2010: 
112).  By  1989,  Tuđman  had  founded  Croatia’s  first  opposition  party,  the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and after the socialist party had undergone a 
transformation similar to that of its Slovenian counterpart in the early months of 
1990,  HDZ came to power  following Croatia’s  first  elections  later  that  year 
(Pavković 2010: 113).       
Civil Society
The Yugoslav transition differs quite substantially from other Eastern European 
cases  where  civil  society  is  concerned  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  unlike 
elsewhere in the region, civil society was fairly strong in Yugoslavia. This state 
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of affairs was a consequence of Yugoslavia’s maintaining good economic and 
political relations with the West, and thus being affected by its liberalism, and by 
the  fact  that  federal  decentralization  resulted  in  a  less  repressive  republican 
context, as noted especially in Serbia and Slovenia. Furthermore, Yugoslavia’s 
more participatory political arrangements and its tradition of labor organizing 
created a social context in which civic associations were perceived to be less 
threatening than within the Soviet sphere. 
Second,  and  rather  counter-intuitively,  the  civil  society  groups  that 
emerged more powerfully in Yugoslavia were not only those we might expect. 
Human  rights  and  democratization  groups  had  less  impact  here  than  in 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany for example. The same goes for peace and 
environmental groups. A possible explanation for this may be that simply by 
virtue of being allowed these liberal elements of civil society were less effective. 
Since freedom of expression was respected to a greater degree than elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe, calls for democracy and human rights were less salient to the 
population at large. Instead, the groups that were able to mobilize the largest 
number  of  protesters  were  nationalist  and  workers’ groups,  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent, students. As this section will show, the relatively advantageous position 
of  civil  society  in  Yugoslavia  failed  to  generate  a  pro-democracy  challenge 
against the state – at both the federal and republican levels — and was quickly 
marginalized by workers and nationalists. This does not mean that other civil 
society  groups were  unimportant,  they  were  not,  but  their  relative weakness 
contributed to steering Yugoslavia in the direction of ethnic strife rather than 
democratization.
 Yugoslav civil society, Vasilevski (2007) writes, “while stronger than in 
most other Eastern European states … was comparatively less important than 
political and economic change from above” (17). While there is an element of 
truth to this statement, Vasilevski’s argument is not completely accurate. It is 
true  that  change  was  accompanied  by  elite  actions,  but  it  was  civil  society 
movements that ultimately forced politicians to abandon the sinking Titoist ship. 
While  civil  society  only  entered  national  politics  in  full  force  in  the  1980s, 
scholars  have  dated  the  beginning  of  civil  society  mobilization  to  the  early 
1960s,  or  at the very latest  to 1966-68 when students occupied all  buildings 
belonging to the university in Belgrade (Licht 2000: 119-20). As in other Eastern 
European countries,  some of the earliest  civil  society  mobilizations  included 
calls for democratization and human rights.
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The Democratization Movement
The early 1970s represented a fairly repressive time in the history of Yugoslavia. 
When Croatian communists began to speak of secession and were charged by 
their Serbian counterparts of wanting to destroy the federation, Tito responded 
with party purges. In the aftermath of these destabilizing events,  the country 
witnessed several political trials with many of the defendants receiving prison 
sentences. By the mid-1970s, leading dissidents began to ask difficult questions 
about “the very nature of the regime” and demanded a change in the direction of 
“pluralism and toward a genuine respect for human rights” (Licht 2000: 120). 
Rather unsurprisingly, these criticisms coincided with the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords in 1975. In the aftermath of Helsinki, a petition movement emerged in 
Belgrade in 1976-77 with people “signing up on political issues, such as the 
death penalty or asking about the fact that the police had the discretion to deny 
citizens their passports and their right to travel abroad” (Licht 2000: 120). The 
movement was fairly limited with each petition attracting between 50 and 300 
signatures,  but “movement opened up a new stage,  which was taken over in 
debates by the Slovenians on such issues as reproductive rights, gay and lesbian 
rights, and nuclear energy” (Licht 2000: 120). Rather tellingly, the human rights 
movement then seems to disappear from the Yugoslav political scene. Whereas 
activists elsewhere in Eastern Europe clung tightly to the human rights rhetoric 
as  their  most  potent  line  of  attack  on  their  governments,  Yugoslav  activists 
appear  to  have  gained little  traction  from it.  There  may  of  course  be  many 
reasons  for  this,  but  a  plausible  explanation  is  that  human  rights  violations 
simply were not an explosive issue in Yugoslavia. As noted above, the country 
was the most open communist state in Europe and enjoyed close ties with the 
West.  As  a  result,  the  human rights  angle  was  not  successful  in  Yugoslavia 
(Woodward 1995: 1). 
It would take another ten years before the democratization/human rights 
rhetoric  reemerged.  Only  in  1988  did  activists  form  “an  organization  for 
Yugoslav democratic initiative” with branches throughout the country. However, 
this  type  of  civil  society  mobilization  occurred  only  after other  Eastern 
European countries had begun to prepare for democratic transition (Licht 2000: 
121).  From  a  theoretical  perspective,  this  is  highly  puzzling.  Why  did  the 
country that seemed best prepared to make the step toward democratization in 
the mid-1980s lag behind the more repressive Soviet satellite states? In addition 
to the solution offered above, that is that Yugoslavia was sufficiently liberal to 
dissuade a popular uprising for Western democracy, it seems that the nationalist 
current  trumped  the  liberal.  However,  one  major  exception  to  the  general 
absence of pro-democracy movements in Yugoslavia did exist. In Slovenia, the 
Committee  for  the  Defense  of  Human  Rights  teamed  up  with  the  Slovene 
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communists (including its media outlets) and the Catholic Church in 1988 to 
organize a campaign of protests in defense of the “Ljubljana Four” — a group of 
journalists that had angered the Yugoslav army by raising questions about its 
arms sales to Ethiopia. While fought in the name of human rights and judicial 
fairness in a democratic context, the fact that all Slovenian power holders united 
in this campaign betrays its nationalist element. In fact, the movement was a part 
of the Slovenian strategy for controlling Milošević (Pavković 2010: 109-10).
Unlike  much  of  Eastern  Europe,  Yugoslavia’s  most  important  pro-
democracy movements took hold in  2000.  In both Croatia  and Serbia,  mass 
mobilizations occurred in line with elections.  Supported by Western funders, 
civil society groups made massive efforts to get people out to vote and monitor 
the elections.  Whereas in Croatia the democratic opposition was able to rely 
solely  on  the  elections  themselves  to  oust  the  ruling  HDZ,  in  Serbia  mass 
demonstrations and a general strike were required to end Milošević’s rule (see 
the section on “Democratization in the Successor States”). 
New Social Movements
Somewhat unsurprisingly, new social movements flourished in Yugoslavia in the 
1980s, in particular in Slovenia and Serbia. The fact that the new ruling elites 
took  a  less  repressive  approach  to  social  control  meant  that  “non-political” 
activism  was  tolerated  and  at  times  even  supported  by  official  socialist 
institutions (Figa 1997: 164). Figa (1997) suggests that civil society emerged in 
Slovenia from the “culturally driven” “alternative scene” that grew out of the 
1970s punk movement,  “the  first  manifestation  of  civil  society  in  Slovenia” 
(Figa 1997: 164).  Slovenian leaders found it difficult to deal with new social 
movements (NSM) that emerged from this “alternative scene”. As Figa (1997) 
explains,
NSMs addressed issues not faced by the political establishment. They posed a 
dilemma for the rulers: By permitting NSMs to operate, the party-state allowed 
them to expand into the space for free expression, thereby giving up control over 
certain social and political processes, even though the party-state at any time 
could lay claim to that space if they were prepared to use violence. By clamping 
down on them it  would arrest  the process  of  democratization.  Yugoslavia  in 
general,  and Slovenia in particular,  were very proud of their  progressive and 
democratic nature vis-à-vis the USSR and its allies. An antidemocratic purge 
would be embarrassing when Soviet totalitarianism was on the verge of collapse. 
(168)
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In  other  words,  the  timing  of  the  emergence  of  the  Slovenian  NSMs made 
repression difficult  for  the  country’s  leaders,  leaders  who were  not  prone to 
repression  in  the  first  place.  Still,  Slovenian  communists  knew  that  the 
destabilizing potential of the NSMs was indeed very real. By exercising self-
restraint and staying away from politically taboo topics, Slovenian activists were 
able to mobilize on a range of issues. “Those issues were rooted in postmodern 
concerns  and  included  opposition  to  using  violence  in  any  form of  human 
interaction,  peace,  minority  rights,  environmental  issues,  alternative forms of 
psychotherapy, and gay rights” (Figa 1997: 168-9). Furthermore, activists within 
the different movements cooperated with one another, as evidenced by “protest 
‘celebrations’”  in  1986  and  1987  that  brought  together  “feminists, 
environmentalists, and pacifists” (Figa 1997: 169). It is also worth noting that 
NSM activists not only exercised self constraint when it came to the issues they 
addressed, they also opted for nonviolent methods of struggle, that is, “various 
forms of peaceful, direct actions, for example distributing leaflets, to appeals for 
action through the official channels.  … They were essentially consciousness-
raising movements” (Figa 1997: 169).
The peace movement was perhaps the most important of the Slovenian 
NSMs, not because it forced Slovenia to pursue progressive policies – it did not 
– but because it drove the Slovenian leaders onto a collision course with the rest 
of the federation. The main issue raised by the peace movement organization, 
which went by the name “The Working Group for Peace Movements,” was that 
of  conscientious objection.  Yugoslavia  utilized very broad conscription rules, 
and  the  concept  of  conscientious  objection  was  foreign  to  the  JNA.  Under 
pressure  from  its  own  citizens  and  in  the  context  of  Serbian  hostility,  the 
Slovenian government agreed to press for changes to the conscription rules at 
the federal level. As a result, relations between Slovenia and Serbia/the federal 
government  soured.  This  development  coincided  with  the  “Ljubljana  Four” 
incident mentioned above, where journalists working for the Slovene publication 
Mladina claimed that the Yugoslav army was illegally selling arms to Ethiopia. 
In this conflict, the Slovene government, which may already have set its mind 
on a divorce from the federation, took the side of the journalists, thus adding 
further fuel to the intra-communist conflict. “The significance of the Slovene 
peace movement,” then, “lies in its impact on Slovene-Yugoslav relations” (Figa 
1997: 170).
Although the Slovenes were the first  to organize on peace issues, they 
were not the only ones. In the mid-1980s, foreign peace activists helped form “a 
small  group  for  peace  and  democracy”  in  Serbia.  The  “Belgrade  Group  for 
Peace  and  Democracy”  was  created,  but  it  was  not  able  to  attract  a  large 
membership as many activists felt that the word “democracy” made the group 
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too political. As a result, the group failed to have an impact comparable to that 
of its Slovenian equivalent (Licht 2000: 121). As one former activist recollects, 
It was fascinating how the issues of peace and democracy were not on people’s 
minds in other parts of the country, including Serbia. They were still impressed 
by the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment, and believed that the issue of war and 
peace was simply unimportant for Yugoslavia as a whole. (Licht 2000: 121)
Women’s  movements  were  perhaps  the  most  well-organized  NSMs  in 
Yugoslavia. Unlike most expressions of civil society, the women’s movement 
organized itself across republican borders and with significant amounts of cross-
national cooperation. 
Yugoslav feminism began in the late 1970s in Belgrade and Zagreb as a critique 
of Yugoslav socialism’s failure to liberate women, a critique expressed mainly 
through  scholarly  publications  and  the  media.  The  feminist  pen  provoked  a 
fierce backlash in the academy, the media, and the organs of the Yugoslav state, 
including  the  official  communist  women’s  conference.  By  the  mid-1980s, 
feminists in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana launched a small but radical new 
social  movement.  This  feminist  activism centered  around  two  new types  of 
activity:  public  forums  and  protests  and  provision  of  independent  self-help 
services  for  women,  plus  continuation  of  the  academic  and  media  work. 
(Benderly 1997: 186)
The main practical concern of the women’s movement was to protect victims of 
domestic violence and lobby on women’s reproductive health issues. Lesbian 
branches of the movement struggled for equal recognition in law. “Unlike other 
NSMs, however, feminism held out little hope that society could be reformed at 
a deep level;  the ideology believed that  patriarchal  control  of women would 
persist in either a socialist or a capitalist system” (Benderly 1997: 183).  The 
destructive developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced the impact 
of the women’s movement and marginalized it as “more important things” filled 
the  agenda.  Women  were  now  expected  to  be  patriotic  and  have  as  many 
children  as  possible  in  order  to  help  their  respective  nations.  Some  of  the 
structural changes experienced were unhelpful, as non-communist arrangements 
following  the  dissolution  of  Yugoslavia  created  high  unemployment  that  hit 
women particularly hard (Benderly 1997: 196-8). Thus, during the civil wars of 
the 1990s,  
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Feminists  in  the Yugoslav successor  states  organized across  national  lines  to 
protest  the war’s impact  on women, and provided small-scale  but significant 
opposition  to  the  war.  They  also  provided  social  services  for  its  women 
survivors.  However,  a  rift  developed  between  those  feminists  who  opposed 
nationalism and those who became more patriotic as they drew parallels between 
the victimization of women and the victimization of their nation. The new states 
marginalized the non-nationalist feminists and attempted to coopt the patriotic 
ones. (Benderly 1997: 184)
In Belgrade, a small group of feminists, “Women in Black,” organized weekly 
silent vigils against the war on the city’s main street. Perceived as unpatriotic, 
“they grew familiar with being spat upon and called traitors and whores,” but 
still managed to organize an antiwar protest event in Vojvodina in 1993. 200 
women  from  all  over  the  former  country  participated,  as  did  women  from 
Western Europe (Benderly 1997: 200).
Yugoslavia  also  hosted  various  environmental  movements,  but  these 
appear  to  have had a  limited  role  in  the country.  Nonetheless,  green groups 
organized in both Serbia and Slovenia. In Slovenia, esteem for the movements 
rose in the second half of the 1980s (as it did everywhere) in the aftermath of 
“several ecological catastrophes” (Figa 1997: 175). In Serbia, on the other hand, 
a  major  anti-nuclear  energy  movement  was  forged in  1986 and 1987.  In  an 
impressive effort, the movement gathered hundreds of thousands of signatures, 
mainly from schools and universities, and actually succeeded in overturning a 
government decision to build a nuclear power plant (Licht 2000: 120-1).  
Religious Movements
Besides the fact that the Catholic Movement eventually came to side with the 
Slovenian government when nationalism became the most  important  issue in 
Yugoslavia, “the religious communists did not play a significant role toward the 
development of a civil society” (Mojzes 1997: 212).
Student Movements
Although students played some part in the 1980s social movements, they did not 
organize  independently  from  other  civil  society  groups  during  the  decade. 
Instead, the impact of student protest was most significant at the beginning of 
civil  society  mobilization  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s,  mainly  in  the 
Croatian protests against Tito and in favor of decentralization (Licht 2000: 120; 
Rusinow 1977: 296-306). Students also came to play an important role in the 
struggle against  Milošević  after  the Dayton Accord had been signed,  first  in 
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1996-97 in response to hijacked local elections, and then during the Bulldozer 
Revolution of 2000 when the student-led Otpor emerged as a powerful political 
player (Marković 2012: 112). While Otpor usually receives most of the credit in 
analyses of  the Serbian case,  Bunce and Wolchik (2011: 97) note “the path-
breaking effect” the eighty-day protests in 1996 and 1997 had on the political 
climate in the country. Also, Otpor grew out of the 1996-97 experience as many 
Otpor activists and leaders participated in the earlier student protests (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2011: 100). 
Labor Movements
The two most important social movements of the Yugoslavian transition process 
were the labor and nationalist movements. While other civil society groups had 
legitimate  grievances  to  vent,  the  Yugoslav  workers  found  themselves  in  a 
unique situation. Yugoslavia was by definition a workers’ state. This meant that 
unlike  other  groups,  workers  were  largely  spared  criticism  from  socialist 
politicians. After all, the workers were the backbone of the state, and how could 
the state condemn its own backbone? Nonetheless, “despite sharply deteriorating 
living  standards,  the  working  class  was  surprisingly  quiescent  in  the  early 
1980s” (Vladisavljević 2008: 111). Strikes and work stoppages did take place, 
but on a manageable level, normally lasting for only a few hours. By 1984, this 
state of affairs began to change. The number of strikes in the country increased 
and  by  1987  the  situation  began  to  spin  out  of  control.   “In  that  year,” 
Vladisavljević (2008) reports,
there were 1685 registered strikes and roughly 4.3 percent of all employees in 
the huge state-controlled sector of the economy took part in strikes as opposed to 
less than 1 percent in previous years. The workers’ protests now lasted longer 
than a day on average and, significantly,  the number of strikes in large state 
enterprises, with more than 500 workers, was sharply on the increase. Roughly 
half of the strikers came from heavy industries and mining, but strikes in other 
sectors of the economy,  as well  as in  health services and education,  became 
increasingly  frequent.  In  1988  the  number  of  strikes  and  strikers  further 
increased, especially in large enterprises, and strikes became longer on average. 
(111)
In the early 1980s, when strikes were fairly limited, worker mobilization was 
concentrated  in  Slovenia  and  Croatia,  the  most  developed  republics  of  the 
federation,  but  by  1987  these  regional  differences  had  all  but  vanished 
completely.  In  short,  workers  throughout  the  country  were  voicing  their 
discontent  with  the  regime.  As  the  next  section  will  show,  however,  their 
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protests  focused overwhelmingly  on economic  and workplace  related  issues, 
with political change a side matter (Vladisavljević 2008: 113-15). The workers’ 
“demands centred on higher pay and subsidies for their deteriorating enterprises, 
the removal of unsuccessful or corrupt enterprise directors and a sharp reduction 
in  bureaucracy  and  administration  within  and  outside  enterprises” 
(Vladisavljević 2008: 111-2). 
Nationalist/Ethnic Movements
While  the  workers’ privileged  position  within  socialist  ideology  gave  them 
significant  leverage  in  their  protests  against  the  state,  it  was  the  nationalist 
movements that tore Yugoslavia apart. Nationalism was not a new phenomenon 
in  1980s  Yugoslavia.  The  country  had  only  been  successfully  established 
following  World  War  II  because  Tito  had  managed  to  repress  nationalist 
hostilities  by  forbidding  debates  about  the  past,  and  attempts  by  Croatian 
nationalists to gain more control of their republic’s economy in the 1970s have 
been touched upon above. Although virtually all national groups were mobilized 
by the end of the 1980s, 
The road to civil war began in March 1981 when Albanian students took their 
demands for better conditions at the University of Prishtinë to the streets in the 
time-honored tradition of students everywhere. Their demonstration touched a 
nerve  of  Albanian  patriotic  feeling,  and  over  the  next  month  anti-Serbian 
demonstrations demanding that Kosova become a Yugoslav republic became so 
massive that the federal government sent in troops. (Stokes 1993: 230)
Serbia was not of course interested in the realization of these demands, and the 
movement did not result in much political gain for Kosova Albanians. However, 
it did contribute to a deteriorating social context in Kosova, and by the mid-
1980s, the autonomous province’s Serb minority felt sufficiently harassed and 
discriminated against to demand change. The Kosova Serb movement began in 
1985 with a protest outside the headquarters of the Kosova Communist Party. 
Not receiving the remedy they sought, the movement submitted a petition with 
2011 signatures to the presidency of the Serbian Communist Party in early 1986, 
“demanding  radical  measures  to  stop  the  continuing  harassment  of  non-
Albanians”  (Pavković 2010:  83).  From this  point  on,  the  movement  quickly 
gathered momentum.  
After  the  first  protest  rally  of  a  hundred  Kosovo  Serbs  staged  in  1986  in 
Belgrade, similar rallies, with greater numbers of participants, were organised in 
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Belgrade as well as Kosovo and Serbian cities. The organisers of these protests 
were Serb and Montenegrin farmers, skilled workers, teachers and low-ranking 
communist  officials.  This  gave  the  movement  the  look  of  an  anti-elite, 
grassroots movement of harassed Serb and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo. 
(Pavković 2010: 83)
With  Milošević’s  rise  to  power,  the  Serbian  nationalist  movement  gained  a 
powerful  supporter.  While  one  should  not  overlook  Milošević’s  political 
calculations, there can be little doubt that the Serbian leader felt strongly about 
the nationalist  issue.  Like many Serbs,  Milošević had no intention of  seeing 
Serbia (or Yugoslavia for that matter) divided into smaller pieces simply because 
Kosova Albanians thought they deserved republican status and thus sovereignty 
over a territory in which they formed the majority. For Serbs, Kosova carries 
strong historical weight since it was here that the Serbs lost a major battle to the 
Ottomans  in  1389,  and  Kosovar  sovereignty  was  inconceivable  to  men  like 
Milošević. 
Unfortunately, the tensions between Serbs and Albanians quickly spread 
across Yugoslavia as other republican leaders saw Milošević as a proponent of a 
“Greater  Serbia”,  a  historical  concept  that  had  only  been  repressed  by  the 
creation  of  Yugoslavia.  Consequently,  nationalists  throughout  the  federation 
came to seize on the notion of sovereignty. Pavković (2010) explains: 
One of the primary aims of each of the dissident national ideologies was to 
reaffirm the sovereignty of ‘its’ nation over the territory that was claimed for it. 
The Croat and Slovene national ideologues saw the reaffirmation of sovereignty 
necessitating  the  creation  of  national  armed  forces  within  a  new  Yugoslav 
confederation or outside Yugoslavia. The reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the 
Muslims was to be carried out first through the reintroduction of Islamic values 
in  public  life  and politics  and eventually in  the creation of an Islamic state. 
Albanian sovereignty was to be achieved first in a separate Yugoslav republic 
and  then,  possibly,  in  unification  with  Albania.  Serb  sovereignty  was  to  be 
reaffirmed  in  the  unification  of  all  Serbs  in  a  reorganized  ‘democratic 
integrative’ Yugoslav federation; if this proved to be impossible, in a Serb state 
without other Yugoslav nations. (97)
Needless  to  say,  the  simultaneous  realization  of  all  of  these  aspirations  was 
impossible. At the core of the matter lay the fact that some republics wanted 
more  decentralization,  or  even  independence,  while  Serbia,  the  heart  of 
Yugoslavia, was not interested. In the context of a severe economic crisis and 
the disrepute of socialism as an economic ideology, few actors had the power, or 
desire,  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  strong nationalist  currents  that  swept  the 
26
country.  As  one  scholar  summarizes  the  situation,  “nationalism  became  a 
dominant  political  force  largely  as  an unintended outcome of  high levels  of 
mobilization and spiraling social, economic and political conflicts in a complex, 
authoritarian multi-national state which experienced a severe economic crisis” 
(Vladisavljević 2008: 6). The fact that republican leaders sought to gain from the 
nationalist tendencies within Yugoslavia did little to prevent this development.
Protest
As the previous section showed, diverse civil society groups engaged in protest 
activities throughout Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Before that, as we have also seen, 
students  protested  in  the  late  1960s.  Mass  mobilizations  also  took  place  in 
Croatia in 1971-2 after communist leaders there began a campaign to register 
people  (ethnic  Croats)  in  the  Party  in  defense  of  nationalist  interests.  This 
nationalist  movement  involved  strikes  and  demonstrations,  including  student 
strikes,  but  was  not  a  “mobilization  for  democracy.”  Rather,  the  Croatian 
movement  set  a  troubling  precedent  for  Yugoslavia  that  would  eventually 
become the norm for mass action in the 1980s:  mobilization for nationalism 
(Pavković 2010: 67-9). Similarly, the workers’ protests that gathered momentum 
in 1982 were not part of a democratization movement, but only demanded pay 
increases and the removal of unpopular managers and directors. What was under 
attack was not Yugoslavia’s political system, but its economic failures. By 1987, 
the strikes had reached enormous proportions, involving 360,000 workers spread 
out over 1570 strikes, four times as many participants as in 1985. Consistent 
with their efforts earlier in the decade, workers protested against income freezes 
and  rapidly  increasing  inflation.  In  the  summer  of  1988,  industrial  worker 
protests reached their crescendo. Some of the major protest events included the 
following: 
May 24: 300 out of 400 miners at the Đurđevik mine in north-east Bosnia 
marched to Belgrade  after  a  5-day strike  failed  to  have  any impact.  Having 
completed the 70 km march, the miners protested in Belgrade until the federal 
authorities agreed to meet their demands. This was “the most visible in a series 
of miners’ protests, triggered by the pay freeze” (Vladisavljević 2008: 114).
June  17:  3,000  metalworkers  from  the  Zmaj tractor  factory  outside 
Belgrade  marched  into  the  capital  and  demonstrated  outside  the  Federal 
Assembly building, and, as a result, secured higher wages. Similar protests were 
held in Maribor (Slovenia) where thousands of TAM (car manufacturer) workers 
demonstrated for higher wages on that day and the next.
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July 6: 5,000 workers from the Croatian Borovo shoe factory near the 
Serbian border struck, and when that didn’t work went to Belgrade by bus. They 
were not seen by the Federal Assembly and therefore broke into the parliament 
building and left only after their demands were met. 
July  16:  1,500  workers  from  Agrokomerc,  a  Bosnian  agricultural 
company, staged a protest in Belgrade for higher wages and the resolution of the 
1987 scandal involving the company. (Vladisavljević 2008: 113-15)
Parallel to these developments in the workers’ movements, Kosova Serbs 
continued  to  mobilize  for  their  cause,  including  large  demonstrations  in 
Vojvodina  and  Montenegro  in  July  and  August  1988.  This  is  where  things 
become interesting from a social movement perspective. Rather than perceiving 
mass  mobilization  within  Serbia  (which  is  where  most  of  the  workers’ and 
nationalist  protests  took  place)  as  a  threat,  Milošević  saw  them  as  an 
opportunity. He had already achieved the status of a hero with the Kosova Serbs, 
and when  he  skillfully  incorporated  the  workers’ movement  into  a  common 
framework – “the  antibureaucratic  movement/revolution”  Milošević  suddenly 
had  a  “powerful  tool”  at  his  disposal  —  mass  rallies  (Stokes  1993:  235). 
Similarly  to  Khomeini’s  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iran,  the  genius  of  the 
“antibureaucratic revolution” was that it came to mean all things to all people as 
it  placed  the  blame  for  Yugoslavia’s  decline  and  internal  difficulties  with 
faceless bureaucrats.  Stokes (1993) has beautifully captured the irony of this 
top-down mass movement:
In the rest of Eastern Europe people power, as it was called after huge popular 
demonstrations brought Corazon Aquino to power in the Philippines in 1986, 
was  a  force  for  democracy  and  pluralism.  In  Serbia,  however,  Milosevic 
mobilized people power to destroy Yugoslavia and to create the conditions for 
civil war. In September and October 1988 thirty thousand, fifty thousand, one 
hundred thousand, even one million people gathered in Serbian cities to shout 
their  approval of Milošević’s effort  to subdue Kosova. When Albanians tried 
rallies of their own or conducted strikes in the important mining industry, as they 
did  in  November  1988,  Milošević  sent  in  the  riot  police  and  arrested  their 
leaders.  …  In  the  rest  of  Eastern  Europe  people  power  toppled  the  old 
Communist  regimes  in  the  name  of  democracy.  In  Serbia,  Milošević 
manipulated  the  same  force  by  racist  appeals  in  order  to  legitimate  his 
transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia into a nationalist party 
organized on neo-Stalinist principles. (235)
28
Under the broad “anti-bureaucratic” umbrella, Milošević mobilized the people 
of “Greater Serbia” in an effort to bring both Vojvodina and Kosova back under 
Serbian control.  The “anti-bureaucratic  revolution” raged between September 
1988 and January 1989, “while the parallel mobilization of Kosovo Albanians 
and protests over the Serb-Slovene conflict  unfolded between November and 
March” (Vladisavljević 2008: 145). In this conflict rich context, Milošević had 
little trouble rendering his nationalist populism attractive to Serbians. Uniquely 
among Eastern European leaders, Milošević relied on what Pavković refers to as 
“rally  fever”,  known  locally  as  the  “happening  of  the  people”  or  “street 
democracy” (2010: 106-7) to mobilize the masses, and he did so to great effect. 
“Between  September  1988  and  March  1989  the  eastern  part  of  socialist 
Yugoslavia experienced high levels of mobilization, which rarely occur under 
authoritarianism.  Public  meetings,  large  street  rallies,  strikes,  marches  and 
demonstrations abounded, with a few hunger strikes, and even violence by the 
end of March” (Vladisavljević 2008: 145). While Yugoslavia thus experienced 
mobilization, it was again not mobilization for democracy, but mobilization for 
nationalism. Even when Milošević did not personally attend protest events, he 
encouraged them. By September 1988, again highly uniquely by authoritarian 
standards,  “high  officials  of  Serbia  now effectively  certified  specific  protest 
groups and their demands and claims as fully legitimate. They openly embraced 
popular participation in politics, albeit on populist terms” (Vladisavljević 2008: 
150).  The  socialist  elite’s  unwillingness  to  defend  the  old  Titoist/federal 
structure of Yugoslavia reached its pinnacle in Serbia: not only would the late 
Tito not be defended, he would be thrown to the wolves.
The anti-bureaucratic revolution passed through distinct regional phases. 
As the tabulation below indicates, large protests occurred in Vojvodina, Serbia, 
and Montenegro. What is particularly interesting about the table below is that 
virtually all protests followed the same pattern, namely that of demonstrations, 
or “rallies of solidarity,” in support of the Kosova Serbs.
Similarly  to  other  instances  of  people  power  mobilizations  in  Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere, the protest activities were almost exclusively nonviolent 
and  demonstrators  always  emphasized  that  they  were  not  anti-systemic. 
“Speeches  delivered  by  Kosovo  Serb  activists  were  always  moderate”  and 
activists “publicly denounced any potentially anti-systemic behavior” that might 
occur during the rallies (Vladisavljević 2008: 141).
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Major “rallies of support” during the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” (source: Vladisavljević 
2008: 151-66)
Location Date Number of participants
Smederevo, Vojvodina 880903 60,000
Kovin, Vojvodina 880903 10,000
Sombor, Vojvodina 880903 2,000
Crevanka, Vojvodina 880903 10,000 (first “multi-national” rally)
Sremska Mitrovica, Voj. 880915 30,000 (government org., incl. counter pro.)
Nikšić, Montenegro 880918 50,000 (more radical, “we want arms)
Cetinje, Montenegro 880918 30,000 (more radical, “let’s go to Kosovo)
Novi Sad, Vojvodina 880925 50,000 (demands for Voj. resignation)
Andrijevica, Montenegro 880925 30,000
Bačka Palanka  NS 881005 50,000 (demands for Voj. resignation)
In support of the Mayor who made the demand
Rakovica (outside BG) 881004 5,000 (at the Federal Assembly in BG)
Milosevic came to speak to demonstrators
Rakovica (outside BG) 881005 5,000 (inside Federal Assembly in BG)
Milosevic came to speak to demonstrators
Novi Sad 881006 100,000 (from all over Vojvodina)
Titograd, Montenegro 881007 25,000 (economic and education demands)
Broken up violently the next day, fizzled out by 
the 10th.
Belgrade 881019 700,000 (archetypal “rally of solidarity”)
Titograd 890110 60,000
Titograd 890111 100,000 (collapse of the Montenegro leadership)
The most important protests of the anti-bureaucratic revolution did not 
take place in Serbia. Here, the plight of the Kosova Serbs needed little agitation 
to  gain  the  attention  of  politicians  and  citizens  alike.  In  Vojvodina  and 
Montenegro on the other hand, both places where large numbers of Serbs lived, 
local elites were less enthusiastic about the movement’s demands. The protests 
in Novi Sad (the capital of Vojvodina) in July and August were crucial because 
they set the pace of the “revolution.” Not only did it  represent a shift  in the 
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location of protests from central Serbia to peripheral areas, it came to signify a 
new phase of mobilization. As one scholar explains, 
the  protest  groups  of  Kosovo  Serbs  and  their  new  allies  from  Vojvodina, 
Montenegro and central Serbia cast increasingly radical demands and targeted 
ever more powerful opponents. Unlike their earlier focus on protection for the 
Serbs by the courts and law enforcement agencies and the politics of inequality 
in Kosovo, they now principally demanded constitutional change in Serbia and a 
temporary shutting down of Kosovo’s party and state organs. Instead of targeting 
Kosovo’s  high  officials,  they  demanded  the  resignations  of  high  officials  of 
Vojvodina and their  other opponents in  the party Presidency and the Central 
Committee  of  the  LCY,  and  denounced  the  leadership  of  Montenegro. 
(Vladisavljević 2008: 139)
The elites in Vojvodina and Montenegro feared that Kosova Serb demands for 
constitutional changes in Kosova, which would bring the autonomous province 
back under Serbian control, would spill over and threaten their own sovereignty. 
These  fears  were  indeed  well  founded.  Discontented  with  their  own  elites’ 
economic leadership, citizens of Vojvodina joined the Kosova Serbs’ call for the 
Vojvodina leadership to step down. Initially, the local communists were able to 
resist  the  large  protests  and  cling  to  power,  but  their  days  in  power  were 
numbered. Eager to push through the constitutional reforms, Milošević and his 
Serbian colleagues supported the protest movement by helping its leaders gain 
access to means of transportation and other material resources (Vladisavljević 
2008:  148).  Thus,  by  early  October  the  Vojvodina  leaders  could  no  longer 
withstand the popular calls for their resignations. On October 6th, Novi Sad came 
to a standstill. Approximately 100,000 people from all over Vojvodina as well as 
supporters from Serbia and Montenegro arrived in Novi Sad to participate in 
what  would  become  known  as  the  Yoghurt  Revolution.  Faced  with 
demonstrators throwing packs of yoghurt at the Province Committee building, 
and without  federal  support,  the  Vojvodina  high officials  resigned  and  were 
replaced by leaders approved by Milošević and his entourage.
With  Vojvodina  in  line  with  Serbian  policy  attention  now  shifted  to 
Montenegro. As in the case of Vojvodina, solidarity rallies for the Kosova Serbs 
had  soon  assumed  a  life  of  their  own,  with  Montenegrins  sensing  their 
opportunity to punish their leaders for the economic crisis. While Montenegro 
had witnessed ongoing protests since September, possibly with a short break in 
December, the final push occurred on January 10th and 11th.
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On  the  early  morning  of  10  January  a  thousand  workers  of  Radoje  Dakić 
[Montenegro’s largest company] set off to protest in the city centre, with the sole 
demand of the resignation of the high officials  of Montenegro,  including the 
republic’s  representatives  in  the  federal  party and state  organs.  Students  and 
citizens joined the demonstration and the number of protesters in the central 
square  rapidly  swelled  to  10  000.  Despite  freezing  weather,  thousands  of 
workers from large state enterprises and citizens from all parts of the republic 
joined  the  demonstration  throughout  the  day  and  evening.  The  number  of 
participants rose to over 60 000. On the following day Montenegro was brought 
to a halt – effectively,  though not officially,  there was a general strike. After 
prolonged deliberation, the high officials resigned. At the time, there were nearly 
a 100 000 [out of a population of 600,000] protesters on the streets of Titograd. 
(Vladisavljević 2008: 164)
Similarly to Vojvodina, the officials that resigned were replaced by candidates 
handpicked by Milošević; this was “the first instance in post-1945 Yugoslavia 
that a communist leader from one republic was able to replace the leadership of 
another republic by his appointees” (Pavković 2010: 106-7). It should be noted 
that  events  in  Serbia,  Vojvodina,  Montenegro,  and  Kosova  did  not  remain 
regional affairs. Of the remaining republics, only Macedonia’s leaders supported 
the  Kosova  Serb  movement.  In  Croatia,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and,  more 
surprising,  liberal  Slovenia,  republican  leaders  condemned  the  Kosova  Serb 
movement  and  supported  the  Montenegrin  authorities’ attempt  to  quell  the 
protests  (Vladisavljević  2008:  180).  This  of  course  had  less  to  do  with  the 
Kosova Serb issue per se than with what was correctly perceived as a Milošević 
power grab. 
In response to what Kosova Albanians viewed as disastrous developments 
in Vojvodina and Montenegro,  1,300 Kosova miners from Stari  Trg went on 
strike several hundred meters below the earth’s surface on February 20, 1989. 
They pledged to only come back up once the new Kosova leadership, made up 
of politicians aligned with Milošević, resigned. After a week below ground, it 
became  clear  to  all  that  the  miners  were  serious  about  their  threat,  and the 
politicians  they  opposed  resigned.  Triumphantly  the  miners  returned  to  the 
surface, only to be arrested for “counterrevolutionary activities” (Stokes 1993: 
235). Furthermore, the three politicians’ resignations were nothing but another 
Milošević  trick,  and  they  were  immediately  reinstated  (Vladisavljević  2008: 
184-5). Only one task remained for the anti-bureaucratic revolution, as 
The Serbian Assembly, along with the assemblies of Kosova and Vojvodina that 
Milošević  now  dominated,  approved  the  new  constitutional  arrangements, 
putting the autonomous regions firmly under the control of the Serbian central 
government  in  March  1989.  Acceptance  of  the  constitutional  provisions 
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produced  six  days  of  rioting  in  Kosova,  which  Milošević  subdued  with 
substantial  loss  of  life  (estimates  ranged  from 20  to  140),  but  many  Serbs 
rejoiced over the restoration of Serbian unity, as they thought of it. “Sovereignty 
returned to Serbia,” crowed the headline in  Politika. “What was more natural, 
more humane, more democratic,  for the Serbian people,” said Borisav Jović, 
Serbian representative to the federal presidency, “than, in accordance with their 
peace-loving traditions,  to  again enter  upon the stage of history and make a 
demand  in  the  form of  the  simplest,  the  most  noble  formula  of  justice  and 
equality. … [Serbs are] the people who in the modern history of the Balkans 
made the greatest sacrifices and demonstrated the greatest scope and evidence of 
its love for freedom and democracy. … Serbia is equal now.” (Stokes 1993: 235)
Rather unsurprisingly, other republics did not share in Serbia’s enthusiasm over 
its  expansion.  Slovenia’s  communist  leader  Milan  Kučan  had  already  stated 
during a public meeting that  took place during the Kosova Albanian miners’ 
strike  that  the  miners  “were  defending  the  very  foundation  of  Yugoslavia” 
(Pavković  2010:  107),  a  comment  less  than  appreciated  in  Serbia  where 
“students  immediately  reacted  to  Kučan’s  statement  by  organizing  huge 
demonstrations at  Belgrade University which drew hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators” (Pavković 2010: 107). Students were not the only ones to react. 
True to form, Milošević used the Slovenian criticism to rally support around 
him, both from the population at large and the media. Yugoslavia was now on 
course for destruction. As Pavković (2010) concludes, “this type of intimidatory 
and coercive style of politics could neither be contained nor controlled within 
the framework of the consensus-seeking federal bodies of Yugoslavia” (107). 
Less than a  year  later,  the glue that  held Yugoslavia  together,  the LCY, had 
ceased to exist and left the road to civil war wide open.
Democratization in the Successor States
Somewhat ironically, civil war in Yugoslavia began with multiparty elections. In 
the  context  of  nationalist  mobilization  and  the  need  for  politicians  to 
disassociate themselves from the country’s communist past, pluralism and multi-
party elections became tactics of political survival. Consequently, by the end of 
1990,  “all  of  the  six  Yugoslav  republics  had  elected,  in  more  or  less  free 
elections,  new  legislatures  and  new  presidents”  (Stokes  1993:  244).  While 
liberal parties made inroads in many of the republics, all six presidents were 
former communists, and two -- Milošević and Montenegro’s Momir Bulatović -- 
“continued to  rule  in  the manner  of  their  predecessors”  (Stokes  1993:  244). 
Hence, in many of the countries it seems fair to speak of rapid democratization. 
Independence also came rapidly to most of the former Yugoslav republics. With 
the exception of the special case of Serbia and Montenegro, the entity that, at 
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least for a while, retained the name of Yugoslavia, all the federated republics had 
become  independent  by  1993.  Montenegro  finally  achieved  independence  in 
2006. Vojvodina and Kosova remain parts of what is now Serbia (Vasilevski 
2007). 
Only in Slovenia, however, did democracy develop somewhat fully in a 
short  length  of  time.  As  the  richest  and  most  European-integrated  country, 
Slovenia quickly seceded from the federation, and with European support it was 
able  to  avoid  a  violent  clash  with  the  rest  of  the  former  country.  Since  the 
Slovenian socialist elites used the country’s conflict with Milošević to propagate 
themselves as the leaders of a liberal regime, multiparty elections and Western 
integration  made  authoritarianism  unlikely.  Thus,  “just  two  years  into 
independence, Slovenia had a new constitution, a politically pluralist landscape 
with ten parties in the Parliament, a free press, and an independent judiciary” 
(Boduszyński  2010:  119).  Unlike  elsewhere  in  Yugoslavia,  “the  process  of 
drafting a constitution that would be the mainstay of Slovenia’s new democracy 
unfolded … smoothly, along with most democratization measures” (Vasilevski 
2007: 7). 
The  second  country  to  democratize  was  Croatia,  after  2000,  when 
Tuđman had died and the HDZ’s hold on power was weakened (Levitsky and 
Way 2010: 117). In both Slovenia and Croatia foreign intervention prevented the 
most severe forms of authoritarian rule. Although Tuđman ruled in a dictatorial 
fashion, due to his country’s dependence on good relations with the West he 
made sure to the country met certain democratic standards. During the war with 
Serbia,  Western  powers  tolerated  Tuđman’s  authoritarian  rule  since  he  was 
considered an important player if the war was to be ended. After the signing of 
the  Dayton  Accords  in  1995,  however,  the  EU  and  the  US  increased  their 
pressure on the president to democratize his country (Boduszyński 2010: 76). As 
a result of the declining economy (Boduszyński 2010: 77), mass protests broke 
out in Zagreb in 1996 (Boduszyński 2010: 88-9) and in 1998 a general strike 
took place (Boduszyński 2010: 90). 
When change finally came to Croatia, it did so through an election victory 
for the opposition. Unlike in the Serbian case where Milošević refused to accept 
defeat, the Croatian dictator had died the previous year, and mass protests were 
not therefore necessary to force a political change. However, this does not mean 
that  civil  society  groups  were  unimportant.  Benefitting  from  the  relatively 
liberal political climate of the 1980s, civil society groups did exist in Croatia, 
although they did not operate freely. Nonetheless, organizations such as GONG 
(Citizens Organized to Monitor Voting) and Glas 99 (Civic Coalition for Free 
and Fair Elections) waged effective get out the vote campaigns in favor of the 
opposition  coalition,  and  engaged  in  independent  election  monitoring.  As  in 
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Serbia,  foreign  governments  and  NGOs  provided  large  sums  of  money  to 
facilitate the efforts of local NGOs and to provide them with training in matters 
such as election monitoring. The United States, through USAID as well as the 
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute were, 
along with the Open Society Institute, the most important funders. “The U.S. 
role  in  this  respect  was  particularly  significant  and  amounted  to  over 
$5,200,000”  (Bunce  and  Wolchik  2011:  83).  In  the  end,  however, 
democratization  in  Croatia  came  from  above  in  the  sense  that  no  mass 
mobilization on the streets proved necessary to force political change. Still, civil 
society organization played an important role in their support of the democratic 
opposition (Bunce and Wolchik 2011: 78-84). 
It  was  in  the  context  of  economic  downturn,  international  pressure,  and  a 
unifying opposition that the HDZ lost support in the last two years of the 1990s. 
The death of ailing President Tuđman in November 1999 was also the symbolic 
death of the HDZ, at least as an anti-systemic nationalist party. Elections held in 
January 2000 dealt a resounding victory to a coalition of pro-Western liberal 
opposition parties. (Boduszyński 2010: 91)
The popular overthrow of Milošević in 2000 set the stage for democratization in 
Serbia,  but  despite  the  encouraging  beginnings  of  post-Milošević  Serbia, 
scholars did not consider the country democratized until “late 2003” (Levitsky 
and Way  2010:  109-13).  As  in  the  case  of  Tuđman,  the  West  had  tolerated 
Milošević’s  authoritarian  leanings.  However,  scholars  have  pointed  out  that 
“though some popular accounts have portrayed Milošević as a dictator akin to 
Iraq’s  Saddam Hussein,  Milošević  did  not  rule  by  terror  or  total  control  of 
information”  and  even  allowed  criticism  of  his  regime,  although  it  was 
forbidden against  him and his  wife  (Boduszyński  2010:  173).  In  reality,  the 
Serbian political power balance was complex. As Levitsky and Way (2010) point 
out,
 the Serbian regime was always competitive. No major parties were banned and, 
prior to the late 1990s, no major politicians were killed, imprisoned, exiled, or 
excluded from elections. Moreover, elections were not simply a façade. Outright 
fraud was relatively limited in scope, which meant that Milošević had to attract 
significant popular support to win presidential  elections.  Legislative elections 
also  were  highly competitive.  In  fact,  the  SPS never  won a  majority  of  the 
legislative vote and, after 1992, it never held a parliamentary majority. Thus, 
Milošević at times struggled to control parliament and even to prevent votes of 
no confidence. (197)
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Still, Milošević managed to cling to both power and considerable popularity by 
painting a  picture  of  a  Serbia  under attack,  and as president  he  was able  to 
circumvent the political process by issuing laws by decree. Although opposition 
parties sought to score political points when Milošević’s dictatorial tendencies 
made themselves manifest, Boduszyński (2010) points out that the opposition 
“was hardly made up only of liberal-minded parties” (180).
Similarly to the case of Croatia, foreign powers eager to come to grips 
with the ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia had little choice but to tolerate 
Milošević,  especially  after  1995  when  he  signed  the  Dayton  Accords  on 
Yugoslavia’s  behalf.  The  international  community  thus  provided  him with  a 
“permissive  international  environment”  (Levitsky  and  Way  2010:  107-8), 
although they combined tacit support with sanctions in what Ray Jennings refers 
to as “schizophrenic” diplomacy (ctd. in Bunce and Wolchik 2011: 93). While 
Western  nations  had  begun  to  criticize  Milošević  as  early  as  1991,  with 
sanctions following in 1992, the devastating war in Bosnia led them to prioritize 
peace over democracy and relations began to change. In 1995, Milošević was 
“embraced”  by  the  world  community  when  he  voiced  his  willingness  to 
participate in the peace process, but when he turned his attention to Kosova and 
allowed horrific violations of human rights to occur, NATO felt obliged to get 
involved militarily in the conflict (Boduszyński 2010: 197-8; Levitsky and Way 
2010: 107-8). Bombs fell on Serbia for 78 days before Milošević caved in and 
signed  an  agreement  that  guaranteed  the  withdrawal  of  Serbian  troops  from 
Kosova. “During the bombing, the population initially rallied around the regime. 
Then support began to wane, falling sharply among nationalists as they realized 
that Kosovo was lost” (Boduszyński 2010: 200). Military humiliation combined 
with an economy in crisis to severely delegitimize the regime. The West did 
what it could to add to the regime’s decline by providing opposition groups with 
money and training, which resulted in a viable presidential candidate, Vojislav 
Kostunica, backed by a nonviolent student movement, Otpor. 
The “Bulldozer Revolution” was in many ways an extension of the 1996-
97 events which saw an opposition coalition,  Zajedno (Together) “mobilize(d) 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  in  daily  protests  for  almost  three  months” 
against  the  government’s  refusal  to  recognize  Zajedno’s  victory  in  local 
elections  (Levitsky  and  Way  2010:  108).  As  in  Croatia,  Western  nations 
eventually saw fit to abandon their partial support of Milošević. In the Serbian 
case, it was in particular “a major change in the U.S. foreign policy” that cleared 
the way for civil society groups. Milošević’s decision to engage Kosova in 1998 
convinced the Clinton administration that the leader’s role as guarantor of the 
Dayton Accords  was no longer  a  sufficient  reason to  tolerate  the regime.  In 
addition,  Milošević  had simultaneously  become more  repressive  at  home,  as 
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evidenced by a  sharp  increase  in  political  assassinations  and other  forms  of 
harassment of the opposition (Bunce and Wolchik 2011: 97-100). 
Responding to the new Serbian context, foreign states and international 
NGOs began to  support  not  only  the  opposition  coalition  DOS (Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia), but also the country’s two main non-political opposition 
groups:  Otpor  and CeSID.  While  Otpor  was  a  nonviolent  mass  organization 
made up mainly by young people and students, CeSID (Center for Election and 
Democracy) was composed of social scientists with a keen interest in statistics 
and polling. A large number of international actors provided both groups with 
extensive  assistance  in  the  shape  of  both  funding  and  training.  Otpor 
campaigned vigorously for the opposition parties and was a main force behind 
their unification. CeSID, on the other hand, trained 10,000 election observers 
and arranged for 23,000 volunteers to monitor the election (Bunce and Wolchik 
2011: 108). CeSID’s work made stealing the election an insurmountable task for 
Milošević. “In fact,” Bunce and Wolchik (2011) write,
 the  vote  tabulation  generated  by  CeSID,  along  with  other  election-related 
activities carried out by the opposition and by CeSID, Otpor, and other civil 
society groups, served as the key stimulus for Serbian citizens to take to the 
streets to demand that Kostunica be allowed to take office. (102)
While democratic gains emerged only slowly after Milošević’s fall, by 2003 the 
country was considered “democratized” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 109-13).   
In  Macedonia,  economic  weakness  meant  that  federal  Yugoslav 
paternalism had to be replaced by Western paternalism. Hence, large sums of aid 
were  given  to  the  country  in  an  effort  to  stimulate  enough  economic 
development  to  stifle  the  ethnic  tensions  brewing between Macedonians  and 
Albanians, the two largest ethnic groups in the country. “With virtually no active 
dissident movement and a weak post-communist civil  society” (Levitsky and 
Way  2010:  124)  present  in  the  country,  international  NGOs  came  to  act  as 
Macedonia’s “de facto civil society” (Boduszyński 2010: 161). This meant that 
policy was dictated by the West and Macedonian governments simply had to 
obey the wishes of foreign donors. The result was what Boduszyński (2010) has 
referred to as “simulated democracy” — a democratic facade designed to satisfy 
donors  and  keep  aid  flowing  into  the  country.  Although  Western  micro-
management was far from ideal, it helped Macedonia avoid the type of ethnic 
strife  that  tormented  much  of  the  rest  of  the  former  Yugoslavia.  Although 
Vasilevski  (2007:  12)  suggests  that  “Macedonia  remains  only  a  transitional 
democracy”,  Levitsky  and  Way  (2010)  conclude  that  the  country  “had 
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democratized  by  the  late  2000s,  due  in  large  part  to  intense  Western 
engagement” (124).
The Bosnia  and Herzegovinan case remains the saddest  of  the six  ex-
Yugoslav republics. Having served as a battlefield during the brutal war of the 
early 1990s, its wounds are still healing. In order to end the war, a compromise 
solution  was  accepted  that  divided  the  country  into  “two  virtually  separate 
entities,  the  Bosniak-Croat  Federation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  the 
Serbian-dominated Republika Srpska” (Vasilevski 2007: 10). The details of this 
arrangement were set in order to protect all  three ethnic groups from further 
victimization.  However,  the consequences of  this  arrangement  is  a  paralyzed 
central state that cannot make any major decisions since both entities have the 
right  to  veto  any  decision.  Since  mutual  distrust  reins  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, both “political democratization and economic reform have been 
painstakingly sluggish” and the country remains in transition (Vasilevski 2007: 
10).
While the successor states display diverging transition trajectories, they 
do have two things in common. First, nationalism has played a crucial role in 
shaping  not  only  relations  between  the  countries,  but  also  domestic  power 
relations. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are examples par excellence,  
where citizens still vote almost exclusively along ethnic lines today. Second, in 
all countries of the former Yugoslavia the international community played an 
immense role in shaping post-Yugoslav developments (Papandreou 2000).  
Conclusion
Even  within  the  admittedly  complex  universe  of  democratization  processes, 
Yugoslavia’s transition to democracy stands out as particularly complicated. The 
range  of  actors  and  ethnic  groups  involved  makes  Yugoslavia  incredibly 
complex.  One  of  the  greatest  challenges  when  speaking  of  Yugoslav 
democratization is that no such thing ever happened. The country that began to 
democratize  earlier  perhaps  than  any  other  Eastern  European  country  never 
completed the process, since it had ceased to exist by the time democracy was 
consolidated. Many lessons can be learned from studying Yugoslavia’s painful 
transition, but the most important from a civil society perspective may well be 
this: it matters little if a country can boast a vibrant civil society if politicians 
and aggrieved groups can turn the population’s attention away from “luxury 
concerns”  such  as  democracy,  human  rights,  and  basic  freedoms  to  more 
primordial issues like nationalism and basic survival. 
What is striking when reading about civil society in Yugoslavia, especially 
in Slovenia and, to a slightly lesser extent, Serbia, is that civil society actors 
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seem to have had more in common with Western Europe than activists in other 
socialist  countries.  If  this  observation  is  correct,  it  points  to  a  potentially 
important theoretical point: in a context of democratization efforts, civil society 
is,  rather counter-intuitively, more potent when repressed and working below 
ground than when given room to maneuver. In the case of Yugoslavia, liberal 
civil  society  groups,  such  as  democratization  and  human  rights  groups, 
completely failed to make their voices heard. The reason for this is simple: if 
authoritarianism is not a big problem in people’s everyday lives, neither can the 
struggle against  such a system be.  In short,  the movement is irrelevant.  This 
dynamic  is  reinforced  if  other  concerns  emerge  as  more  salient,  such  as 
nationalism and a failing economy. Thus, in the Yugoslav case we might suggest 
that the democratization movement did not fail because of state repression, but 
rather because rival movements, in particular ethnic/nationalist  ones, came to 
dominate civil society as mass mobilization.      
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